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FOREWORD 
 
 
This document has been produced at JRC, Institute for Energy, within the frame 
of the institutional action SAFELIFE - Safety of Ageing Components in Nuclear 
Power Plants.  SAFELIFE provides an integrated approach to R&D activities on 
critical issues for plant life management on ageing nuclear power installations.  
 
This document provides training material to be used in connection to formal 
expert judgement, especially in the field of structural integrity. This training 
material was initially developed for a JRC-IE case study on the use of formal 
expert judgement in the field of structural integrity. Additional training material 
focused on important issues identified during the case study will be developed to 
support the specific needs and characteristics of structural integrity problems. 
The training material together with the document summarising formal expert 
judgement [1] should be seen as an information package useful for technical 
experts involved in formal expert judgement exercises. 
 
 
 
 
   
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The process of formal expert judgement usually consists of the following steps:  
1) Identification and selection of issues about which the expert judgements 
should be made. 
2) Identification and selection of experts. 
3) Training of experts and definition of variables to be elicited. 
4) Individual work of experts.  
5) Elicitation. 
6) Analysis and aggregation of results and, in case of disagreement, attempt to 
resolve differences.  
7) Documentation of results, including expert reasoning in support of their 
judgement.  
 
Experts may be asked for judgements in different forms, such as single point 
estimates, ranking alternatives with paired comparisons, discrete event 
probabilities, or as distributions of continuous or discrete uncertain quantities. In 
our case we focus on the last type of expert judgement (continuous uncertain 
quantities), i.e. elicitation of probability distributions. 
 
Ideally the experts should have a solid background in probability theory and 
statistics. However, this is often hard to achieve, especially if probability and 
statistics are not used daily in their work. Even if the experts are familiar with 
most of the concepts, they may lack the knowledge of subjective interpretation of 
probability and may not be aware e.g. of the cognitive biases related to 
judgements. Thus a training session is an important part of the expert elicitation 
process. 
 
In order to familiarise experts with the process of providing subjective 
assessments and understanding subjective probability related issues, a training 
session should be given. There should be a clear definition of the issues on 
which experts have to make judgements and, as a help, decomposition can be 
used in case of complex issues. The training of experts is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter5. 
 
The expert training covers the following issues: 
• Familiarising the experts with the expert judgement process and 
motivating them to provide formal judgements. 
• Giving training on concepts and laws of probability, and on expressing 
judgements formally. 
• Informing the experts about possible biases in expert judgement and the 
application of debiasing techniques. 
• Exercises. 
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2 TRAINING MATERIAL 
 
The training material presented in Appendices 1-3 consists of three parts:  
1. An introduction to expert judgements and training on concepts and laws of 
probability (Appendix 1) 
2. Training on heuristics and biases in expert judgements (Appendix 2) 
3. Exercises (Appendix 3) 
 
2.1 Introduction to expert judgement and basic concepts of probabilities 
 
Providing formal expert judgements is usually unfamiliar to experts. Further they 
may worry that their judgements may be misused or misinterpreted. Thus it is 
very important to familiarise experts with the process. The need and purpose of 
expert judgements should be made clear, and it should be stressed that there is 
not only one right answer. The formal expert judgement is rather a tool to 
summarise the current information, and it identifies where sufficient knowledge 
exists and where more research is needed. 
 
Since expressing judgements as probabilities is seldom part of daily life of 
experts, it is useful to explain basic concepts and main properties of probabilities 
during the training. Use of expert opinions to produce probability distributions to 
express the uncertainties is based on the concept of subjective probability. Thus 
it is very important to explain the various concepts or interpretations (e.g. 
classical, frequentistic and subjective) of probability. 
 
Experts should be trained to some extent to explicitly express their judgements, 
and this can be helped with practical examples. Most expert judgements can be 
aided by decomposing the problem (disaggregation), and examples of 
decomposition can be helpful. Problem decomposition is widely used in scientific 
studies to simplify a complex problem into components that are more 
manageable and more easily solved. These less complex assessments are then 
recombined into a probability distribution for the quantity of interest. Examples of 
modes of decomposition are event trees, fault trees and functional 
decompositions. Decomposition may also use physical models of the 
phenomena. In such case the physical relationship between the quantity of 
interest and several constituents is expressed through a mathematical function. 
 
Appendix 1 contains the training slides on formal expert judgements and 
concepts and laws of probability. 
 
2.2 Training on biases and debiasing techniques  
 
Training should also be provided on the heuristics and on the biases they lead to. 
Training on biases may help individuals to make better probability assessments. 
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Their knowledge is therefore essential in the elicitation process to avoid 
systematic errors. 
 
According to the subjectivistic school of probability, the probability of an event is 
a measure of a person’s degree of belief that the event will occur. In most cases 
experts must synthesize or construct probability values and distributions when an 
analyst asks for them. In this process of estimating probabilities or determine 
degree of belief, experts use “rules of thumb”, the so-called heuristics.  
 
Heuristics are easy and intuitive ways to deal with uncertainties, but since they 
are at best only approximate procedures, they can lead to predictable “errors”. By 
“error” we mean a violation of the axioms of probability or an estimate that is not 
in accord with the expert’s beliefs and that the expert would like to correct if the 
matter was brought to his/her attention. ‘Errors’ could also be systematic 
underestimation or over estimation of quantities. These “errors” in the context of 
expert elicitation are called biases. Because of the existing biases the question 
of how to minimize biases and systematic errors in elicitation is essential.  
 
Awareness of heuristics and biases may help individuals to make better 
probability assessments, and thus they should be introduced and discussed 
during the training for expert judgements. 
 
Appendix 2 contains the training slides on heuristics and biases. 
 
2.3 Exercises 
 
It is common in the expert elicitation process to have exercises for expressing 
uncertainty with probabilities. These exercises do not have necessarily to be 
related to the area of expertise of the experts. In the exercises, experts will be 
asked to give estimates for a set of seed variables. Seed variables are variables 
whose values are known by the normative expert(s), but not by the substantive 
experts. They are used as feedback to expert, and they can help them to 
estimate their subjective sense of uncertainty. 
 
In our exercise, experts were asked to provide 5%, 50% and 95% quantiles for 
the distributions of the seed variables, and afterwards the true values were 
shown to the experts. In principle, events that are assigned a given probability 
should occur with a relative frequency equal to that probability. For example, if 
we have a set of 20 seed variables, for a well-calibrated expert, approximately 
one out of 20 true values should fall below the estimated 5% quantiles, and one 
over the 95% quantiles. In 10 cases the true values should be larger than the 
expert’s median and in 10 cases smaller. Comparing the true and the estimated 
values, the experts can identify whether they tend to be e.g. overconfident, or 
give systematically too high/low values. If 3 or 4 values fall outside the 90 % 
bands, it can be interpreted as sampling fluctuations, but if e.g. 10 out of 20 true 
  3 
values are outside the bands, there is reason to suspect that the expert chooses 
the uncertainty bands too narrowly. 
 
Appendix 3 contains an introduction for the exercises. The questions used in the 
case study have been excluded. Questions on general knowledge whose values 
are known can be chosen for the exercises.  
 
 
3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This report documents the training material for expert judgement applications in 
the field of structural integrity. Due to this specific application field, some 
emphasis is given on lifetime distributions. Otherwise, the training material is of 
very generic nature and can be used for any application of formal expert 
judgement. 
 
Based on the experience obtained from the JRC-IE internal case study, we 
recommend further development of following issues in the training: 
 
• An example of a deterministic and probabilistic structural analysis to 
highlight the identification and treatment of uncertain parameters. 
• Guidance on propagation and management of uncertainties. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] Simola, K., Mengolini, A. & Bolado-Lavin, R. 2005. Formal expert 
judgement. An overview. EUR 21772 EN. 
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1Expert Judgment Training
INTRODUCTION TO 
EXPERT JUDGEMENT
Expert Judgement Training
CONCEPTS AND LAWS 
OF PROBABILITY
Expert Judgment Training
Contents 
• About expert judgements
• Expert elicitation approaches, NUREG-1150
• Concepts of probability
• Probability distributions
• Expert elicitation
• Heuristics and biases
• Exercises
• Presentation and discussion of the case
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Need for expert judgements
Expert judgements are useful in evaluating 
uncertainties when
• there is not enough data or good models available
or
• their use is too expensive or time consuming
Expert Judgment Training
About expert judgements (EJs)
People make judgements daily:
“I think it’s going to rain today”
“I do not believe that republicans will win the presidential 
election”
Advantages of a formal EJ process:
• Explicit
• Systematic
• Uncertainties are described with probabilities
• Attention is paid to possible biases in judgements
=> more precise and reliable judgements
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Parties involved in an EJ process
Decision maker
• uses the outcome of the EJ process
Normative expert(s)
• Experts in decision analysis, probability an statistics, cognitive 
psychology
• Lead the EJ process
Technical experts (a.k.a. domain / substantive experts)
• Know well the issue
• Analyse the problem, evaluate the values of parameters and 
their uncertainties
Generalists
• Wide background knowledge in the area of interes
• Clear idea about the targets of the whole project
Expert Judgment Training
Criteria for selection of experts
• Reputation in the field of interest
• Experimental experience in the field of interest
• Number and quality of publications in the field of interest
• Familiarity with uncertainty concepts
• Diversity in background
• Awards
• Balance of views
• Interest in the project
• Availability for the project
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Expert elicitation approaches
History of structured use of expert opinions:
After WW II development of Delphi method & scenario analysis
(RAND Corporation)
Most well known methodology in nuclear industry:
“NUREG-1150” Severe accident risks: an assessment for five 
U.S. NPP (1990)
Benchmark exercise on Expert judgement 
Techniques (EU Concerted action 1996-1998)
comparison of several approaches 
Expert Judgment Training
Phases of NUREG-1150 approach (1/3)
1 Identification and selection of the case
• Goal of elicitation, variables to be quantified
2 Identification and selection of experts
Technical experts
• Represent highest knowledge in the field
• Independent
• Diversity in background
Normative experts
• Knowledge of probability theory, statistics, formal  
expert elicitation
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Phases of NUREG-1150 approach (2/3)
3 Discussion on the issue
• Refining the definition of variables to be quantified
4 Training of experts
• Concepts of probability
• Heuristics and biases in EJ
• Elicitation, examples
5 Individual work of the experts
• Literature reviews, analyses, simulations 
Expert Judgment Training
Phases of NUREG-1150 approach (3/3)
6 Expert elicitation
• Interviews of experts: 1) experts present the rationale 
behind their assessment in non-quantitative manner
2) Individual interviews for obtaining quantitative 
assessments
• Documentation and validation of reasoning
7 Aggregation
• Aggregation of experts’ estimated
• Review of disagreements
misjudgements / truly conflicting opinions
8 Documentation and communication
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Approach to be used in this case
Same basic steps and principles as in NUREG-1150
Lighter approach
• Less demanding requirements for experts
• Reduced resources for analyses
Expert Judgment Training
Concepts of probability
&
Probability distributions
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Concepts of probability
Classical probability
Logical probability
Frequency interpretations
Propensity interpretations
Subjective probability
Expert Judgment Training
Classical probability
• The theory of chance consists in reducing all the events of the same 
kind to a certain number of cases equally possible, that is to say, to 
such as we may be equally undecided about in regard to their 
existence, and in determining the number of cases favorable to the 
event whose probability is sought. The ratio of this number to that of 
all the cases possible is the measure of this probability, which is 
thus simply a fraction whose numerator is the number of 
favorable cases and whose denominator is the number of all the 
cases possible. (Laplace 1814)
• When are events of the same kind?
• What about probabilities in infinite spaces? 
E.g. Bertrand’s paradox
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Frequentistic interpretation of probability
• The probability of an attribute A in a finite reference classB is the 
relative frequency of actual occurrences of A within B
• Called also statistical / empirical / objective probability
• Unrepeatable events? 
• Excludes many natural uses of probability:
“probably I will miss my bus today”
“it is highly improbable that there is life on Mars”
Expert Judgment Training
Subjective interpretation of probability
• Probability is degree of belief
• Called also Bayesian interpretation of probability
• Probability expresses the observer’s uncertainty of the outcome
• Dependent on the observer
• Dependent on the information available
• Subjective probability is updated with new information
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Subjective interpretation of probability
• A coin has been tossed but we have not yet seen the result. What is 
the probability of tails?
• What is the probability that the population of Paris was larger than 
the population of London in 1930?
• The events are no more random
• If correct answers are unknown, the estimates are uncertain
Expert Judgment Training
Axioms and laws of probability
I Probability of an impossible event is 0
Probability of a certain event is 1
The probability for an outcome of event A, P(A), is a number 
between 0<P(A)<1
II The probability of the complement of A, “not A”:
P(not A) = 1 – P(A)
III Intersection of two events
P(A&B)=P(A|B)P(B)= P(B|A)P(A)
P(A|B) is the conditional probability:
probability of A given that B has occurred
10
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Intersection of two events - example
P(A&B)=P(A|B)P(B)= P(B|A)P(A)
P(A)=0.3
P(B)=0.5
P(A|B)=1/4
P(B)=1/2
P(A&B)=1/4 x 1⁄2 = 1/8
Expert Judgment Training
Axioms and laws of probability
• Probability of the union of two events: P(A +B)=P(A)+P(B)-P(AB)
• If the events are mutually exclusive, P(A+B)=P(A)+P(B)
In a certain manufacturing process the probability of type I defect is 
2%, the probability of a type II defect is 4% and the probability of 
having both types of defects is 1%.
What is the probability that a randomly chosen product has a defect 
of any kind (I, II or both)?
P (A or B) = 0,02 + 0,04 – 0,01 = 0,05
• Decomposition of an event:
• P(A) = P(A|B)P(B) + P(A|not B)P(not B)
11
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Bayes’ rule
P(A|B) = P(A)xP(B|A)/P(B)         [ or P(A|B) = P(A&B)/P(B) ]
Important e.g. for illustrating a bias called base rate fallacy:
Someone has the symptoms of a disease which takes two forms, both fatal, 
requiring two different medicines.
Only one medicine can be taken and medicine A does not work for form B of 
the disease and medicine B does not work for form A of the disease.
Form A of the disease occurs 10% of the time in the population whilst form B 
occurs 90% of the time. After taking an 80% reliable A/B test it says 
that this person has form A of the disease. Which medicine to take?
Axioms and laws of probability
Expert Judgment Training
P(A) = 0.1 P(B) = 0.9
P(TA|B) = P(TB|A) = 0.2 P(TA|A) = P(TB|B) = 0.8
P(TA) = P(TA|A)P(A) + P(TA|B)P(B) = 0.8x0.1 + 0.2x0.9 = 0.26
Probability of having the form A, given the test result TA:
P(A| TA) = P(A)xP(TA |A)/P(TA) = 0.1x0.8 / 0.26 = 0.31
while  P(B| TA) = 0.69
A person is likely to take the treatment for form A of the disease despite a 
20% chance that he could have form B and only 10% of people in the 
population have form A.
12
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Probability distributions
• Discrete distributions
e.g. Bernoulli distribution
Binomial distribution
Poisson distribution
• Continuous distributions
e.g. Uniform distribution
Normal distribution
Beta distribution
Lifetime distributions: defined in the interval (0,∞)
• Exponential, Weibull, Gamma, Lognormal,...
Expert Judgment Training
Binomial distribution
Two outcomes of events A & notA: P(A) = p       (P(notA)=1-p)
Probability of obtaining exactly k times A in n independent trials:
X ∼ Bin(n,p)
Useful for systems with two possible outcomes of events 
(failure/no failure) in cases with known, finite number of 
independent trials, and their ordering does not effect the 
outcome
Coin tossing
Probability of detection in ultrasonic testing
More than two possible outcomes => multinomial distribution
knk pp
k
n
kXP −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛== )1()(
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Poisson distribution
Poisson distribution treats systems in which randomly occurring 
phenomena cause irreversible transitions from one state to another
Examples:
• radioactive decay
• number of road accidents within a year in certain crossing
• randomly occurring shocks causing degradation in a structure
θθ −== e
k
kXP
k
!
)(
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Definitions related to probability distributions
• Probability density function f(x)
probability that outcome x for an experiment occurs within dx about x
• Cumulative probability function F(x)
probability that X occurs between (xmin, x)
Central concepts in reliability and failure analyses
• Reliability function R(t) = 1-F(t)
R(t) = 1-F(t) i.e. probability that the item will not fail between (0,t)
• Hazard rate (conditional failure rate) λ(t)
λ(t) = f(t)/R(t) i.e. probability that the item will fail within dt
given that it has survived to time t
Ageing items have an increasing hazard rate
∫=≤= x
x
duufxXPxF
min
)()()(
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Exponential distribution tetf λλ −=)(
Lifetime distribution of random failures. 
Constant hazard rate (given the device 
has survived time T, the probability of 
failure within ∆t is independent of T)
Very commonly used in reliability 
estimates for active components, such 
as pumps, valves,...
Cannot be used if an ageing 
phenomenon is present
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Gamma distribution
Suitable distribution to describe failure 
time of a system subjected to repetitive 
random shocks that occur according to 
a Poisson distribution
Failure probability depends upon how 
many shocks the device has suffered, 
i.e. its age.
Gamma function should be used if the 
mean rate of wear is constant but the 
rate of wear is subject to random 
variations
Note: if α=1, we obtain the exponential 
distribution. α >1 indicates ageing
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Weibull distribution
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Appropriate for fitting data for which the 
conditional probability of failure 
satisfies a power law as a function of 
time.
Failure distribution of a device 
consisting of large number of identical 
components failing independently 
according to gamma distribution, and 
all have to function for device not to 
fail.
Note: if the shape parameter α=1, we 
obtain the exponential distribution.
α >1 indicates ageing
Expert Judgment Training
Lognormal distribution
Logarithm of failure time t is normally 
distributed
Suitable distribution when considerable 
uncertainty in failure parameters
Is typically used if data for rarely 
occurring events is not extensive, and 
component failure rates may vary by 
factors.
Skewness to higher times incorporates 
the general behaviour of the data for 
unlikely phenomena: occurrence of 
infrequent but large values
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Decomposition of variables
Often the original problem can be decomposed in smaller parts
• more manageable, easier to evaluate
• combined using the rules of probability calculus
=> Better estimate of the variable
Example: event tree
P1
1-P1
P2
1-P2
P2
1-P2
PIE PIEP1P2
PIEP1(1-P2)
PIE (1-P1) P2
PIE (1-P1)(1- P2 ) 
Safe state
Failed
Degraded
Degraded
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Elicitation 
Median value:
X>f50 is as possible as X<f50
Max and min values for X
Fractiles
f5, f25, f75, f95 ...
E.g. f5: P(X< f5)= 0.05
Expert thinks that the probability that the 
parameter value is smaller or equal to 
f5 is the same as that he would draw 
the right card among twenty cards
Fractiles and fitted cumulative distribution
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x
Balls in an urn: what is the chance of picking up 
a red ball... 
Illustration of probabilities
Paper with e.g. a 10 x 10 grid: chance of 
picking up a certain square = 1/100
Or 10 x 10 cm of millimeter paper: chance of 
picking up a certain mm2 = 1/10000  (10-4)
Consider 1 km long road. 
A probability 10-6 corresponds to the chance of 
selecting a certain 1 mm of the road... 
Expert Judgment Training
Good calibration and high information
Good calibration but lower information
Poor calibration, over-confidence
true value
Performance measures
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HEURISTIC AND BIASES 
IN EXPERT JUDGEMENT
Expert Judgement Training
Source: Kahneman,D. , Slovic P. and Trevesky, A. (1982). 
Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases.
Expert Judgment Training
HEURISTICS AND BIASES
Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of 
uncertain events.
People rely on a limited number of heuristic principles
What determines such beliefs? How do people assess the probability 
of an uncertain event or the value of an uncertain quantity?
These beliefs are usually expressed in statements such as “I think 
that…”, “chances are …., “it is likely that…”…
2Expert Judgment Training
HEURISTICS AND BIASES
Heuristics are often useful, but may often lead to severe 
and systematic errors
Heuristics are “rules of thumb”, easy and intuitive ways to 
deal with uncertainties
Biases: Cognitive, Structural, Motivational, Background, Affective
Awareness of heuristics and biases may help individuals 
to make better probability assessments
Expert Judgment Training
BIASES 
Cognitive biases the way we process information, the way 
we reason linked to rational and 
experiential level
Structural biases the way individual the elicitation process is structured
Motivational biases the way we distort our judgment due 
to our beliefs and ideology
Background biases our experience
Affective biases the way we feel, emotional level
Statistical biases Lack of capability to deal with statistical concepts 
3Expert Judgment Training
HEURISTICS
• Representativeness
• Availability
• Affect heuristic
• Adjustment and anchoring
• Overconfidence
• Control 
Expert Judgment Training
REPRESENTATIVENESS  
John is an athletic young guy who owns a sport car and has a 
charming blond girlfriend.
An Example of Representativeness 
Is John a nurse or a professional football player?
We often judge that if X represents well group A, 
the probability that X belongs to A is high
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• Biases due to misconception of chance
• Biases due to insensitivity to prior probability
• Biases due to insensitivity to sample size 
We can further distinguish:
REPRESENTATIVENESS : BIASES
Expert Judgment Training
REPRESENTATIVENESS : BIASES
People tend to expect in the small behaviour that behaviour that
they know exists in the large: “Belief in the law of small numbers””
Why???
1) HTHTTH
2) HHHTTT
3) HHHHTH
For example:
People believe 1 more likely than 2 and 3
Misconception of chance (1)
We expect that a sequence of events generated by a random process will 
represent the essential characteristics of that process even when the 
sequence is short.
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REPRESENTATIVENESS : BIASES
Insensitivity to prior probability  (2)
We often pay too much attention to specific details 
while not paying enough attention to base rates
though
Base rates of outcomes should be a major 
factor in estimating their frequency
For example
For each description the probability that the person is an 
engineer was asked. 
Personality tests administered to 30 engineers and 70 lawyers.
On the basis of this information, thumbnail descriptions 
of the 30 lawyers and 70 engineers were written.
Expert Judgment Training
REPRESENTATIVENESS : BIASES
Insensitivity to prior probability  (2)
Example (continue)
Jack is 45 year old. He is married and has four children. He is generally 
conservative, careful and ambitious. He shows no interest in political and 
social issues and spends most of his free time on his hobbies which include 
home carpentry, sailing and mathematical puzzles. Is he an engineer or a 
lawyer?? 
Dick is a 30 year old man. He is married with no children. A man of high ability 
and high motivation, he promises to be quite successful in his field. He is well 
liked by his colleagues. Is he an engineer or a lawyer?? 
Judged with high probability to be an engineer
Judged to be at 50% an engineer, forgetting prior probability 30:70 
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Giving worthless evidence causes
the subject to ignore the prior probabilities; 
when  no specific evidence is given, 
prior probabilities are properly utilized
REPRESENTATIVENESS : BIASES
Insensitivity to prior probability  (2)
Example (continue)
Reversing the proportions - 70 engineers and 30 lawyers - have no effect 
on estimating the person’s profession, given the description.
Why??
Responses were based on how much the described person was judged to 
be a lawyer or an engineer
Expert Judgment Training
Insensitivity to sample size  (3)
REPRESENTATIVENESS : BIASES
We tend to ignore sample size and to use only 
superficial similarity measures
Why??
Question:   which hospital do you think recorded more days?
Answer : in 95 interviews only 21 gave the right answer
Small hospital: 15 babies/day
The size of a sample withdrawn from a population should affect the 
likelihood of obtaining certain results in it 
For example: Large hospitals: 45 babies/day
For 1 year, the no of days with more than 60% boys 
were recorded
It is known that 50 % of babies are boys
7Expert Judgment Training
REPRESENTATIVENESS : BIASES
• Larger absolute variations 
expected in larger 
samples/populations
• Larger relative variations 
expected in smaller 
samples/populations
Expert Judgment Training
AVAILABILITY
We think about how often we have encountered patrolmen during the daily 
drive to work in the last ten years
Availability can be a useful heuristic, when the frequency of the available 
situation is likely to be well correlated to actual frequency
however
Availability is also influenced by other factors, and therefore reliance on such 
heuristic can lead to biases.
An Example of Availability
Which is the probability to encounter patrolmen on the way to work?
Sometimes people assess the probability of an event by the ease with which 
instances or occurrences can be brought to mind. 
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• Biases due to the retrievability of instances
• Biases due to ease of imaginability
• Perception of risk
We can further distinguish:
AVAILABILITY: BIASES 
Expert Judgment Training
AVAILABILITY: BIASES
When the size of a class is judged by the availability of its instances, a class 
whose instances are easily retrieved will appear more numerous than a class 
of equal frequency but whose instances are less easily retrieved. 
In a study, groups of subjects heard a list of well-known personalities of 
both sexes, all containing the same amount of men and women. They 
were asked to judged whether the list contained more men or women.
When the list contained names of men that were relatively more famous 
than the women, the subjects judged that such list contained more men 
than women (and vice versa).
Retrievability of instances (1)
For example:
Subjects erroneously judge that sex (class) that have 
the more famous personalities was the more 
numerous. 
Why??
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AVAILABILITY: BIASES
Suppose you need to assess the frequency of a class whose instances are not 
stored directly in memory, but that can be generated (imagined) according to 
some given rule.
For instance, you are asked to consider a group of 10 people who form 
committee of k members, with 2 ≤ k ≤ 8. 
•Is it possible to form more committees of 2 people or of 5 people?
•Is it possible to form more committees of 2 people or of 8 people?
The exact solution is given by the binomial coefficient: ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
k
10
This number is maximum for k=5 (252). Moreover, as any choice of k 
members also define a choice of (10-k) members, the number of k-members 
committee is equal to the number of (10-k)-members committees! 
Ease of imaginability (2)
Example
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AVAILABILITY: BIASES
Bob
Jack
Sarah
Ed
Scott Luke
Kelly
Paul
Ann
Jane
…mmm… the number of 2-people committees 
must be greater than the 
number of 8-people committees !
Ease of imaginability (2)
10
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AVAILABILITY: BIASES
This was proved in a study.
Subjects estimated a number of committees that was decreasing with 
increasing committee size k.
The exact solution is 45 in both cases !!
For instance, the median estimate for 2-members committees was 70, 
whereas the estimate for 8-members committees was 20 !
Ease of imaginability (2)
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AVAILABILITY: BIASES
Perception of risk (3)
Availability heuristic 
determine biases in the 
responses 
People asked to estimate 
the probability of death 
from various causes 
Overestimation of less 
frequent/more “publicized” 
causes; ex: botulism
Underestimation of more 
frequent/less publicized 
causes; ex: stroke, cancer
11
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AFFECT HEURISTIC
Availability may work not only through ease to recall, but also because 
remembered images come marked with affect. 
Biases that have been attributed to availability heuristic may be 
due at least in part to affect
The experiential system relies on images 
and associations linked by experience to emotion and affect
Thought is made of images
Each image gets marked with “positive” or “negative” mark linked to 
somatic or body states.
When a negative mark is associated with a future outcome: an alarm is 
activated
When a positive mark is associated with a future outcome: there is a signal 
of incentive 
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ADJUSTMENT and ANCHORING
In many situations, a natural starting point, or anchor, is selected as 
first approximation to a value of the quantity to be estimated
The initial value may be suggested by the formulation of the 
problem, or may be the result of a partial computation.
The value is then adjusted to reflect supplementary information.
In either case, adjustment are typically insufficient and the estimates 
are biased towards the initial values
12
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ADJUSTMENT & ANCHORING: BIASES
• Insufficient adjusting
• Biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive 
events
We can further distinguish:
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ADJUSTMENT & ANCHORING: BIASES
In a study, groups of subjects were asked to estimate the percentage 
Q of African countries in the United Nations.
A “wheel of fortune” was spun to produce a quantity A, with 1<A<100. 
The subjects were led to believe that the result was a random number 
between 0 and 100, but in fact the wheel yielded either 10 or 65.
After obtaining A, subjects were asked if Q was greater or less than A.
They were then asked to adjust their response up or down from A.
Result
The median percentage Q of African countries in the United 
Nations was 25 when A was 10 and was 45 when A was 65.
Insufficient adjusting (1)
Example 1:
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ADJUSTMENT & ANCHORING: BIASES
In another study, 2 groups of high school pupils were asked to 
estimate, within 5 seconds, a numerical expression written on the 
blackboard.
One group estimated the product: 8x7x6x5x4x3x2x1
Because adjustments are typically insufficient, the experimenter 
predicted underestimation in both cases. 
Median estimate for ascending sequence = 512
Median estimate for descending sequence = 2250
The other group estimated the product: 1x2x3x4x5x6x7x8
Further, because the result of the first steps of the multiplication are 
higher in the first case than in the second, the first expression was 
judged larger than the second (anchoring of result to incomplete 
computation).
Correct result: 40320 !
Insufficient adjusting (1)
Example 2:
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ADJUSTMENT & ANCHORING: BIASES
1) Drawing a red marble from an urn containing 50 red and 50 blue 
marbles;
2) Drawing a red marble seven times in a row (with replacement) 
from an urn containing 90 red and 10 blue marbles;
3) Drawing a red marble at least once in seven successive tries 
(with replacement) from an urn containing 10 red and 90 blue 
marbles.
Events of type 1) are simple events.
Events of type 2) are called conjunctive events
Events of type 2) are called disjunctive events
Evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events (2)
Example 1 :
Suppose now you are given the following three events. On which one 
would you bet 10 € as being the most likely?
14
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ADJUSTMENT & ANCHORING: BIASES
It was shown in a study that:
When comparing a simple event and a conjunctive event, a significant 
majority of subjects preferred to bet on (i.e. to consider more likely) 
the conjunctive event.
At the same time, when comparing a simple event and a disjunctive 
event, a significant majority of subjects preferred to bet on the simple 
event.
That is, in this study for a majority of subjects:
P(conjunctive event) > P(simple event) > P(disjunctive event)
In reality:
0.48 0.5 0.52<              <
Evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events (2)
Example 1:
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ADJUSTMENT & ANCHORING: BIASES
The explanation given to this bias is given in terms of anchoring:
The stated probability of the simple event (success at any one stage) 
provides a natural starting point for the estimation of the probabilities of 
both conjunctive and disjunctive events.
Since adjustment from the starting point is typically insufficient, the final 
estimates remain too close to the probability of each elementary event 
in both cases.
Note the the overall probability of a conjunctive event is lower than the 
probability of each elementary event, while the probability of a disjunctive 
event is higher than the probability of each single elementary event.
As a consequence of anchoring, the overall probability will be 
overestimated in conjunctive problems and underestimated in 
disjunctive problems
Evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events (2)
Example 1:
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OVERCONFIDENCE AND CALIBRATION
Calibration curve:
assessed probabilities are 
plotted against actual 
frequency
Well calibrate judge: 
curve near the diagonal
Under confident judge:
assessed probabilities 
nearer to 0.5 than they 
should be
Overconfident judge:
assessed probabilities too 
near certainty (0 or 1)
Not directly related with an estimation heuristic, however in some 
cases anchoring can aggravate it. Overconfidence can express itself 
as poor calibration.
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OVERCONFIDENCE AND CALIBRATION
Perfectly calibrated experts:
Interquartile index of about 50%
Surprise index of about 2%
Interquartile range: interval 
between 25% and 75% 
quantiles. 50% of true values 
should fall in this range
Surprise index: percentage of 
true values that fall below the 
lowest or above the highest 
quantiles
16
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LACK OF CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH 
STATISTICAL CONCEPTS: BIASES 
• Difficulties to distinguish means and medians
– many experts provide medians when asked for means (it is easier to 
compute a median than a mean: equal probability vs. integral or sum of a 
series)
• Difficulties to evaluate measures of spread (standard 
deviations). 
– Sometimes this problem is linked to the problem of overconfidence
• Difficulties to use Bayes Theorem as the main tool to 
update information
• Excessive tendency to fit opinions to the normal model
– Extensive use of this model in probability courses
– Uncertainty reducing mechanism (symmetry).
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CONTROL 
One opponent was instructed to be shy and insecure
The other was instructed to be confident and self-possessed
We think we can control the situation
Why???
In certain case we tend to act as if we can influence
the situation over which in reality we have no control at all. 
For example two opponents have to cut a deck of cards
subjects are asked to bet on one of the opponents
Subjects thought to have a better chance of winning against
the insecure opponent, betting a higher amount on money on him 
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Introduction to Exercises  
 
 
   
ASSESSMENT OF UNCERTAIN QUANTITIES 
 
 
In the following, you will be asked to assess and give your estimates regarding 
twenty different quantities. These range from familiar to less familiar ones.  
 
For each question, you are asked to give: 
 
• The median value; 
• The 5% percentile; 
• The 95% percentile; 
 
The median value should be what you think is the best estimate you can come 
up with. In other words, it can be seen as the number you judge to be as likely to 
be above the true (unknown) value as it is to be below it. 
 
The 5% percentile is the number that you judge only in 5% of the cases could be 
exceeded downwards by the true (unknown) value. 
 
The 95% percentile is the number that you judge in 5% of the cases could be 
exceeded upwards by the true (unknown) value. 
 
Let us consider an example.  
 
I am asked to assess the following quantity: the number of airplanes that 
departed from Schiphol Airport yesterday. 
I know that Schiphol is pretty busy, having flown from there many times in the 
past. Last time I was there my flight was late, they did not let me in the Business 
Suite and I was utterly bored, so I counted the numbers of flights departing 
between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. and found out that these were roughly 50.  
So now I use this knowledge and I make the assumption that this rate would 
probably occur continuously between 7.00 a.m. and 10 p.m. That makes 15 
hours and 750 flights. So I round it up to 800 flights to consider also the flights 
that depart in the middle of the night.  
I am thus quite happy to say that my median estimate is 800. Now I ask myself: 
what would the 5% percentile? Well, after all, my estimate was based on a single 
sample taken on a different day of the week. Maybe there are more flights per 
hour in general, maybe my assumption to keep the rate constant over 15 hours is 
quite off the mark. I am pretty sure (and willing to take a bet with odd 5 to 95) that 
there must have been at least 700 departures from Schiphol yesterday. Also, I 
am pretty (95%) sure that the number of flights cannot exceed 1000 (I think I 
have heard once that Frankfurt, which I am pretty sure is bigger than Schiphol, 
had 1100 departures on the peak day of the season last year). 
 
 
   
So: 
 
5% percentile =   700 
median =    800 
95% percentile =  1000 
 
Please note that the distance between the 5% percentile and the median is 
different from the distance between the median and the 95% percentile. This can 
be done as a distribution can be skewed to the left or to the right. This is entirely 
up to your judgement. 
 
At the end of the exercise, we will give the correct answers. Please note that you 
will be self-evaluating your effort. We will not ask you to make your estimates 
public. So do not worry too much if some of your estimates are wildly off the 
mark. This is bound to happen some times. Just remember our training, if you 
are very uncertain about some quantity, just spread out your 5 and 95% 
percentiles to take this into account.  
 
At the end, we will only ask you where each true value falls with respect to your 
percentiles. Namely, we will ask you in which category (defined by your 
estimates) the true value falls. 
 
 
Category 2 Category 3
 
True value 
Your 95% 
percentile 
Your 
Median 
Your 5% 
percentile 
 
 
 
Category 1 Category 4 
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